University of Miami Law School

Institutional Repository
University of Miami Race & Social Justice Law Review

8-1-2016

The U.S. Supreme Court and the Nation’s PostFerguson Controversies
Christopher E. Smith

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umrsjlr
Part of the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United
States Commons
Recommended Citation
Christopher E. Smith, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Nation’s Post-Ferguson Controversies, 6 U. Miami Race & Soc. Just. L. Rev. 53 ()
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umrsjlr/vol6/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Race &
Social Justice Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.

The U.S. Supreme Court and the Nation’s
Post-Ferguson Controversies
Christopher E. Smith*

I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 53
II. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND GUIDELINES FOR POLICE
PRACTICES ....................................................................................... 57
A. The Diminution of Individualized Suspicion for Police Stops ... 60
B. Insufficient Recognition of the Problems of Racial
Discrimination ........................................................................... 66
C. Shift in Perspective to De-Emphasize Remedies for Rights
Violations ................................................................................... 71
III. CONCLUSION.................................................................................... 76

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2014 and 2015, the public’s attention was repeatedly drawn to
highly-publicized incidents in which unarmed African Americans were
killed or injured by police officers who used force under circumstances
that generated strong debates about the officers’ methods and
justifications. 1 A 12-year-old boy in Cleveland was shot to death by
police while playing on a playground with a toy gun. 2 Elsewhere in
Ohio, a young man was shot to death by police inside a Wal-Mart store
after he picked up a pellet gun from a shelf and headed toward the
*
Professor of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University. A.B., Harvard University,
1980; M.Sc., University of Bristol (U.K.), 1981; J.D., University of Tennessee, 1984;
Ph.D., University of Connecticut, 1988.
1
See, e.g., Michael Wines & Sarah Cohen, Police Killings Rise Slightly, Though
Increased Focus May Suggest Otherwise, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2015),
http://nyti.ms/1Q3aFD9.
2
See Elahe Izadi & Peter Holley, Video Shows Cleveland Officer Shooting 12-YearOld
Tamir Rice within Seconds, WASH. POST
(Nov. 26, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/11/26/officials-release-video
-names-in-fatal-police-shooting-of-12-year-old-cleveland-boy/.
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cashier’s station with the apparent intention of purchasing the item. 3 A
New York City man suspected of illegally selling unpackaged cigarettes
died when wrestled to the ground by an officer using a chokehold.4 A
police officer in South Carolina fired eight times at the back of an
unarmed man fleeing on foot after a traffic stop and falsely claimed that
he feared for his life because the man had seized the officer’s Taser and
was going to use it on the officer.5 The killing likely would have been
ruled a justifiable homicide based on the officer’s claims except that,
unbeknownst to the officer, his actions were being filmed by a witness
with a cellphone. 6 A student leader at the University of Virginia bled
profusely from his face when pushed roughly to the ground by alcohol
control officers. 7 Less well-known cases throughout the country became
matters of intense local concern. 8 These publicized events came on the
heels of years of controversy and in New York City, culminated in the
filing of a federal lawsuit over the police department’s practice of
making thousands of stops and searches of young minority men without
a proper legal basis. 9
The incident that generated the most national attention, as well as
countless protest marches in cities throughout country, 10 was the
3

See Elahe Izadi, Ohio Wal-Mart Surveillance Video Shows Police Shooting and
Killing
John
Crawford
III,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
25,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/post-nation/wp/2014/09/25/ohio-wal-mart-surveillance-video-shows-policeshooting-and-killing-john-crawford-iii/.
4
See Marc Santora, Eric Garner’s Family to Sue New York City Over Chokehold
Case, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/08/nyregion/ericgarners-family-to-sue-new-york-city-over-chokehold-case.html.
5
See Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, South Carolina Officer Is Charged With
Murder of Walter Scott, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1yTohXD.
6
See id.
7
See Gary Robertson, Bloody Arrest of Black Virginia Student Spurs Second Day of
Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2015/03/20/us/
20reuters-usa-police-virginia.html.
8
See, e.g., L.L. Brasier, Video Shows Police Beating During Traffic Stop, DETROIT
FREE PRESS (Mar 25, 2015), http://on.freep.com/1buk47C; Richard Fausset, Police
Shooting Victim in Georgia Tried to Follow ‘Sensible’ Path, N.Y. TIMES (Mar 24, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/25/us/atlanta-police-shooting-victim-tried-to-live-alife-that-mattered.html; J. David Goodman and Vivian Yee, Officer Charged in Akai
Gurley Case Debated Reporting Gunshot, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Feb 11, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/12/nyregion/akai-gurley-shooting-deatharraignment.html.
9
See Benjamin Weiser and Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says New York City Will Settle
TIMES
(Jan.
30,
2014),
Suits
on
Stop-and-Frisk
Tactics,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/nyregion/de-blasio-stop-and-frisk.html.
10
See generally Emily Brown, Timeline: Michael Brown Shooting in Ferguson, MO,
USA TODAY (Aug. 10, 2015), http://usat.ly/VpsbtG (detailing the timeline of events,
starting with the shooting of Michael Brown).
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shooting death of unarmed, teenager Michael Brown of Ferguson,
Missouri, in August 2014, by Officer Darren Wilson, who avoided
criminal charges for the incident.11
The unusual grand jury
proceedings 12 that led Officer Wilson to avoid criminal charges sparked
protests, civil disorder, and property damage in Ferguson. 13 The U.S.
Department of Justice subsequently issued a scathing investigative report
detailing policing and court practices in Ferguson that targeted lessaffluent African Americans with numerous citations, fines, and jailing
fees as a means to generate revenue to fund city government. 14 Thus, the
controversy over the situation in Ferguson served to represent and
embody widespread issues about race, policing, use of force, and
discrimination in the justice system. 15
The policing and court system issues raised by the events in
Ferguson and comparable incidents throughout the nation are considered
local matters albeit widespread and existing locally in cities and counties
throughout the country 16 due to fragmentation in the American justice
system 17 caused by federalism issues. 18 Federal authorities responded in

11

See William Freivogel, What’s Different About the Grand Jury in the Darren Wilson
Process?, ST. LOUIS PUBLIC RADIO (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.tinyurl.com/ololwm6.
(The unusual aspects of the grand jury proceedings included the lack of specific charges
pursued by the prosecutor, the large amounts of information indiscriminately presented
without prosecutorial guidance, and the presentation of witnesses that the prosecutor
knew to be lying.) See, e.g., Peter Holley, Ferguson Prosecutor Says He Knew Some
Witnesses Were ‘Clearly Not Telling the Truth.’ They Testified Anyway, WASH. POST
(Dec. 20, 2014), http://wapo.st/1wXOHIQ; Jeffrey Toobin, How Not to Use a Grand
Jury, THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk/use-grand-jury.
12
Id. See also Stephanie Francis Ward, Public Was Misled About Ferguson Grand
Jury Proceedings, According to Federal Complaint, A.B.A.J. (January 5, 2015),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/public_misled_about_ferguson_grand_jury_proc
eedings_according_to_federal_co.
13
See Aamer Madhani, Protests Ease as Snow Falls on Ferguson, USA TODAY (Nov.
27, 2014), http://usat.ly/1zXRD8T. See also David McCormack, Protests Break Out
Across NINETY Cities as Thousands March in Anger, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 24, 2014),
http://dailym.ai/lvj8zq8.
14
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE
FERGUSON
POLICE
DEPARTMENT
9–15
(Mar.
4,
2015),
http://www.justice.gove/sites/default
/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report_1.
pdf.
15
Tierney Sneed, Ferguson’s Problems Are Not Ferguson’s Alone, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/08/22/
fergusons-racial-problems-are-not-unique-to-ferguson.
16
Id.
17
See, e.g., GEORGE F. COLE, ET AL., THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 97
(14th ed. 2015) (“Because both state and federal systems operate in the United States,
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limited ways to push toward reform through such means as President
Obama’s appointment of a national task force to quickly study problems
and make recommendations for police reform. 19 The Director of the FBI
spoke publicly about problems with racial discrimination in policing. 20
In addition, the U.S. Department of Justice conducted an investigation of
Ferguson, just as it had done with other cities whose police departments
sparked concerns about improper use of force by officers.21
The federal judiciary, by contrast, cannot similarly respond in
proactive fashion because of the need to wait for legal cases to be
developed, presented, and work their way through the court system for
judges’ decisions about specific legal issues. 22 Yet, this is not to say that
the judicial branch lacks involvement in the contemporary controversies
about race, policing, and use of force.23 Indeed, decisions by the U.S.
Supreme Court helped to shape and even facilitate the practices that gave
rise to these highly-publicized, tragic incidents. 24 Thus, this article will
examine the Supreme Court’s role, by commission and omission, in
generating the current historical moment of controversy and conflict.

criminal justice here is highly decentralized . . . .[A]lmost two-thirds of all criminal
justice employees work for local governments.”).
18
See id. (“The majority of workers in all subunits of the [justice] system—except
corrections—are tied to local government . . . .As a result, local traditions, values, and
practices shape the way criminal justice agencies operate.”).
19
See Exec. Order No. 13,684, 79 Fed. Reg. 76,865. (Dec. 18, 2014).
20
Nia-Malika Henderson, FBI Director Comey Gave a Bold Speech on Race and
POST
(Feb.
12,
2015),
Police.
Now
What?,
WASH.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2015/02/12/fbi-director-james-comeygave-a-bold-speech-on-race-and-police-now-what/.
21
See Matt Appuzo & Manny Fernandez, Federal Inquiry of Ferguson Police Will
TIMES
(Sept.
4,
2014),
Include
Apparent
Racial
Profiling,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/us/racial-profiling-by-ferguson-police-to-be-part-offederal-inquiry.html?_r=0 (“Broad Justice Department investigations like the one Mr.
Holder announced on Thursday can lead to voluntary policy changes or agreements that
give the federal government oversight over a police department. Before Ferguson, there
have been 20 such broad investigations under Holder.”).
22
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS AND PUBLIC POLICY 41 (Nelson-Hall Pub.
eds., 1993) (“The policy agendas of judges are determined by the cases initiated in court
and judges do not have the same ability as other governmental officials to . . . consciously
pursu[e] favored policy issues.”).
23
See e.g, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding
that the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk practices disproportionately targeted young minority
males without a proper legal basis, and ordering immediate reforms to end the
constitutional violations).
24
See generally, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (broadening the ability
of police to conduct investigative stops, diluting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
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THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND GUIDELINES FOR
POLICE PRACTICES

For much of American history, police officers were often
unprofessional bullies acting on behalf of the local political regime rather
than civil servants trained to carry out important functions for public
safety. 25 As described by policing historian Samuel Walker, police
officers were patronage appointees of mayors and other political leaders
who “enforced the narrow prejudices of their constituencies, harassing
‘undesirables’ or discouraging any kind of ‘unwelcome’ behavior.”26
However, in the mid-twentieth century, several influences pushed
American police departments to professionalize and reform, including
changing public expectations, 27 police executives’ growing interest in
effective policing, 28 and later, the threat of lawsuits for improper use of
force and other rights violations by police.29 One additional factor had a
significant impact on the professionalization of police policies and
practices: U.S. Supreme Court decisions defining constitutional rights
that simultaneously told law enforcement officers what they could and
could not do. 30 Many of the police-behavior limiting decisions were
produced during the Warren Court era of the 1960s 31 by Supreme Court
justices who came into adulthood carrying personal memories and
experiences from encounters with the abusive behavior of pre-1940s
police. 32 The Supreme Court’s composition changed significantly
beginning with President Richard Nixon’s election in 196833 and
25

See SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM 133 (1977)
(“Brutality and uncivil conduct had long been part of the American police tradition.”).
26
SAMUEL WALKER, “Broken Windows” and Fractured History: The Use and Misuse
of History in Recent Police Patrol Analysis, 1 JUST Q. 75, 84 (1984).
27
See id. at 80–83.
28
COLE, ET AL., supra note 17, at 182–83.
29
CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE
CREATION OF THE LEGALISTIC STATE 72–77 (2009).
30
Christopher E. Smith, Police Professionalism and the Rights of Criminal
Defendants, 26 CRIM. L. BULL. 155, 157–158 (1990).
31
See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (establishing a bright-line
exclusionary rule for evidence obtained through improper searches); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 492 (1966) (holding that police officers are obligated to inform suspects of
constitutional rights prior to custodial questioning); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)
(requiring that specific factual circumstances must exist in order for police officers to
conduct stop and frisk searches).
32
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT 34–36
(1997).
33
See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 119 (2003) (“When Richard
Nixon ran for president of the United States in 1968, he made law and order a central
campaign issue, in part, by accusing the Supreme Court and other federal judges of being
too soft on crime.”).
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continuing for the next quarter century in which only Republican
presidents 34 had the opportunity to appoint new justices to the nation’s
highest court. 35 A primary consequence of the Court’s altered
composition was that “decisions on criminal justice, abortion, and other
issues changed significantly between the early 1970s and the early
1990s.” 36 With respect to criminal justice, the Republican presidents37
who appointed Supreme Court justices and other federal judges during
this era sought to emulate Nixon’s effort to “appoint new judges who
would alter the balance between protection of rights and crime control by
giving greater emphasis to the empowerment of law enforcement
officers.” 38 The majority opinions produced by the Supreme Court’s
new, more-conservative orientation led observers to view criminal justice
decisions, in particular, as the area in which these presidents enjoyed
success in triggering the alteration of constitutional law. 39 As subsequent
sections of this article will explain, this diminution and dilution of rights
affecting criminal justice, 40 along with the attendant expansion in police
34

See THOMAS R. HENSLEY ET AL., THE CHANGING SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 35 (1997) (“Presidents Nixon, Reagan, and Bush used their
appointments to select justices whom they hoped would slow or reverse the liberal civil
rights and liberties decisions of the earlier Warren Court era.”).
35
See LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION
32 (2012) (“[N]o Democratic president made a Supreme Court nomination from 1967
until 1993 . . . .”).
36
HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 34.
37
See, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 334 (2d ed. 1985) (“[President Reagan] insisted
that his nominee meet his political ideological criteria. Thus the Reagan team had
searched for a woman with demonstrable conservative political and judicial views.”);
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH & JOYCE A. BAUGH, THE REAL CLARENCE THOMAS:
CONFIRMATION VERACITY MEETS PERFORMANCE REALITY 19 (2000) (“In sum, Bush
wanted to nominate a politically conservative African American to the Supreme
Court . . . .[Clarence Thomas] received strong support from conservative interest groups
that Bush sought to please . . . .”).
38
SMITH, supra note 33.
39
See, e.g., CHARLES M. LAMB & STEPHEN C. HALPERN, THE BURGER COURT AND
BEYOND, IN THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL PROFILES 434 (Charles M.
Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern ed. 1991) (“[T]he Burger Court significantly chipped away
at Warren Court precedents in such constitutional areas as criminal procedure . . . .”); JAN
CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR
CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 29 (2007) (“During [William]
Rehnquist’s remarkable thirty-three year judicial career, he eventually molded other
justices to his strong law enforcement views.”).
40
See, e.g., WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE
INTERROGATION PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON 4 (2003) (“[T]he Warren Court interpreted
the due process test so as to expand protections afforded suspects subjected to police
interrogation, [but] the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have interpreted Miranda so as to
diminish suspects’ protections.”).
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officers’ authority and discretionary actions,41 helped to create the
environment that produced post-Ferguson controversies about
contemporary policing. 42
From a rights-protective perspective, we have seen a downward slide
over time from the specific requirements of Warren Court decisions,
such as Terry v. Ohio 43 and Miranda v. Arizona. 44 In the contemporary
era, research studies and news stories remind us that police often adapt
their behavior to avoid legal requirements created by the Supreme
Court 45 or, unfortunately, act with impunity in clear violation of the law
and with the apparent belief that they will not be caught and held
accountable. 46 The Supreme Court’s role in this slide stems from
numerous decisions that diluted the clarity and strength of the Warren
Court’s decisions creating clear, strong rights-protective rules to guide
police conduct. 47 Consequently, the Supreme Court has abdicated, at
least in part, 48 its role for sending messages to the law enforcement
community about the importance of rights, the constitutional requirement

41

See, e.g., SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: MYTH & REALITIES 107 (2004) (“[T]he
Supreme Court during the Burger Court (1969–1986) and Rehnquist Court (1986–[2005])
eras made many of the decisions that increased police officers’ opportunities to undertake
and justify warrantless searches.”).
42
See infra notes 62–180 and accompanying text.
43
Compare Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (requiring specific facts and
circumstances to justify a stop-and-frisk), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
(requiring specific warnings to detained suspects prior to custodial detentions), with infra
notes 50–63 and accompanying text (analyzing Terry’s narrow ruling and its effect on
police actions).
44
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Warren Court required specific
warnings be given to detained suspects prior to custodial interrogations. See SMITH, supra
note 32 at 213–20.
45
RICHARD A LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICES 119–64 (2008).
46
See, e.g., Jason Molinet, 10 San Bernardino County Deputies Suspended After Video
Shows Beating of Suspect Who Fled on Horseback, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr, 10, 2015),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/california-deputies-investigation-brutalbeating-article-1.2180308 (news helicopter filmed from overhead as numerous sheriff
deputies hit and kicked a handcuffed arrested man after he led them on a chase through a
mountainous wilderness area); David von Drehle, Line of Fire, TIME (Apr. 20, 2015), at
24–31 (police officer in North Charleston, South Carolina, was unknowingly filmed by a
bystander as he shot an unarmed, fleeing man in the back after a traffic stop).
47
See infra notes 62–180 and accompanying text.
48
The contemporary Supreme Court issues decisions that support rights in the context
of criminal justice, but these rights-protective decisions are not as numerous as its
decisions that reject suspects’ and defendants’ claims and thereby increase the flexibility
and authority for decision making by police and prosecutors. See Madhavi M. McCall et
al., Criminal Justice and the 2010–2011 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 53 S. TEX. L. REV.
307, 312 (2011); Madhavi M. McCall et al., Criminal Justice and the 2008-2009 U.S.
Supreme Court Term, 29 MISS. COLL. REV. 1, 4 (2010).
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of individualized suspicion, and the threat of legal accountability for
improper police conduct.49

A. The Diminution of Individualized Suspicion for Police
Stops
The Warren Court addressed police officers’ legal authority to stop
and frisk pedestrians in its seminal decision Terry v. Ohio in 1968. 50 The
decision was made by the Supreme Court at the height of its most liberal
composition with respect to the relatively large number of justices who
regularly supported suspects’ and defendants’ claims in two-thirds or
more of criminal justice cases. 51 It is instructive to revisit the Court’s
holding in Terry because it defined very specific factual circumstances
and officers’ reasonable conclusions from those circumstances that were
needed in order to justify a stop-and-frisk. 52 Chief Justice Warren’s
majority opinion said the following:
We merely hold today that where a police officer
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in
the course of investigating this behavior he identifies
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries,
and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of
the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him. 53
Within this holding there are very specific elements that officers
must observe and use as the basis for reasonable conclusions about the
suspect being armed and dangerous in order to justify a warrantless stopand-frisk search. 54 Clearly, Chief Justice Warren’s opinion sought to
49

The idea that the Supreme Court sends messages that instruct the public about
values and democracy has been embodied in political science literature that characterizes
the Supreme Court as a “republican schoolmaster.” Charles H. Franklin & Liane C.
Kosaki, Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and
Abortion, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 751, 751 (1989).
50
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
51
SMITH, supra note 32, at 7.
52
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
53
Id.
54
SMITH, supra note 33, at 154–55.
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narrowly define and limit the circumstances in which individuals’ liberty
and reasonable expectations of privacy could suffer intrusions based on
police officers’ suspicions and desire to stop and frisk a pedestrian. 55
By contrast, if we fast forward to the second decade of the twentyfirst century, little may remain, in practice, of Chief Justice Warren’s
specific, careful requirements for stops as, in New York City, for
example, where litigation revealed that officers made stop-and-frisk
searches based merely on marking a checklist box for “furtive
movement.” 56 In a lawsuit against New York City, officers testified that
they used the “furtive movement” category to stop people who were
merely “being fidgety, changing directions, walking in a certain way,
grabbing at a pocket, or looking over one’s shoulder,” 57 a far cry from
the specific observations required by the Terry standard. 58 New York’s
practices resulted in stops of hundreds of thousands of pedestrians, most
of whom were African American and Hispanic. 59 The practice was
driven by police administrators’ use of recorded stops as a quantitative
performance measure for officers,60 a belief that such numerous stops
deterred people from carrying firearms, 61 and explicit instructions from
supervisors for officers to target young minority men for investigation. 62

55

Id.
Behind the Decision on the Stop-and-Frisk Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/08/12/nyregion/10-years-of-stop-andfrisk.html?_r=0; GREG RIDGEWAY, ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE NEW YORK
POLICE DEPARTMENT’S STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK PRACTICES 54 (2007).
57
Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-practiceviolated-rights-judge-rules.html.
58
See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
59
Joseph Goldstein & Wendy Ruderman, Street Stops in New York Fall as Unease
Over Tactic Grows, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2012); Jennifer Gonnerman, Officer Serrano’s
Hidden Camera; The Stop-and-Frisk Trials of Pedro Serrano: NYPD Rat, NYPD Hero,
N.Y. MAG. (May 19, 2013), http://nymag.com/news/features/pedro-serrano-2013-5/.
60
Joseph Goldstein, In Its Defense, Police Dept. Cites Laziness of Its Officers, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 2013, at A15.
61
Michael Cooper, The Diallo Shooting: The Stop-and-Frisk: Procedure Was Once to
Protect the Police, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1999, at B3.
62
See Gonnerman, supra note 59 (description of tape recorded meeting between
Officer Serrano and his precinct commander, Deputy Inspector McCormack. Serrano
tried to defend himself, but McCormack continued, “For the 4-12s in the 4-0, you know, I
could see in Central Park maybe that would be fine, but this ain’t Central Park.” The
longer the conversation continued, the more heated both men became. Serrano: “Mott
Haven, full of blacks and Hispanics. Okay . . . So what am I supposed to do? Is it stop
every black and Hispanic?” He repeated the question several times. McCormack: “This is
about stopping the right people, the right place, the right location . . . [t]ake Mott Haven,
where we had the most problems. And the most problems we had there were robberies
and grand larcenies.” Serrano: “And who are those people robbing?” McCormack: “The
56

62
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The use of pretextual, racially-skewed investigative stops by police is not
limited to pedestrian-focused New York City as it is also used in other
locations where it is most evident in traffic stops and searches.63
While the police abuses that gained public attention in 2014 and
2015 are the product of law enforcement practices that self-consciously
and aggressively investigate people deemed “suspicious” by police
officials, 64 decisions by the Supreme Court also contributed to officers’
greater sense of discretionary freedom that has contributed to improper
conduct. During the Burger Court era, in United States v. Mendenhall, 65
for example, police officers approached a woman at an airport, asked for
identification, questioned her, and ultimately escorted her to a private
area where a search of her clothing revealed that she was carrying illegal
narcotics. 66 Seven justices, including the four dissenters, treated her
encounter with the police as a “seizure” according to the principles of
Terry. 67 However, a total of five justices concluded that she had
consented to the search and therefore, no violation of rights occurred.68
The decision effectively endorsed the notion of profiling suspects based
on limited facts that fell well short of the required factual observations
specified in Terry. 69 The officers in Mendenhall approached the suspect
based on a claim that she fit a “drug courier” profile, 70 even though the
four dissenters found her behavior to be lacking indicators of
suspiciousness. 71 The dissenters specifically referenced language from

problem was, what, male blacks. And I told you at roll call, and I have no problem telling
you this: male blacks, 14 to 20, 21.”
63
See Jeff Rojek, Richard Rosenfeld & Scott Decker, Policing Race: The Racial
Stratification of Searches in Police Traffic Stops, 50 CRIMINOLOGY 993 (2012) (study of
police and racial profiling in St. Louis); CHARLES EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE
STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP (2014) (study of police and racial profiling in
Kansas City).
64
Goldstein, supra note 9; Gonnerman, supra note 59; Cooper, supra note 61; Charles
Epp & Steven Maynard-Moody, Driving While Black, WASH. MONTHLY (Jan./Feb. 2014),
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/january_february_2014/ten_miles_square
/driving_while_black048283.php?page=all.
65
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
66
Id. at 549.
67
Id. at 560 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgement); id. at 571
(White, J., dissenting).
68
Id. at 559–60.
69
See id. at 567–68 (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Government sought to justify the
stop by arguing that Ms. Mendenhall’s behavior had given rise to reasonable suspicion
because it was consistent with portions of the so-called ‘drug-courier profile’ an informal
amalgam of characteristics thought to be associated with persons carrying illegal
drugs.”).
70
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
71
Id. at 572.
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Terry 72 in observing that “[w]hat the agents observed Ms. Mendenhall do
in the airport was not ‘unusual conduct’ that would lead an experienced
officer reasonably to conclude that criminal activity was afoot, . . . but
rather the kind of behavior that could reasonably be expected of anyone
changing planes in an airport terminal.”73
Indeed, several facts that the officers regarded as “suspicious,” such
as the fact that she was changing airlines and carried no luggage, should
have been free from any inferences of suspicion when officers quickly
learned that this was an interim stop so that any luggage would have
been transferred between planes by airline baggage handlers and ticketed
through to her final destination.74
The Mendenhall decision effectively invited officers to stop
individuals in circumstances that did not provide the factual basis
required for stopping people in Terry v. Ohio.75 In addition, the
Mendenhall opinion explicitly expressed the presumption that people
know that they are free to walk away from police officers,76 even though
officers do not inform them about their rights in Fourth Amendment
contexts. 77 This convenient bit of fiction, namely that people know they
can walk away from police officers and decline requests to answer
questions and consent to searches, 78 contributed to the dilution of Fourth
Amendment protections, including those in Terry that focused on an
affirmative obligation of police to have specific observations in order to
justify a stop. 79 By diminishing the recognition of and emphasis on stops

72

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 572 (White, J., dissenting).
74
Id. at 573.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 554.
77
See Robinette v. Ohio, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (officer at a traffic stop who requests
permission to search a car does not need to inform the driver of his right to say “no”).
78
See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 47–48 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Ohio
Supreme Court was surely correct in stating: “Most people believe that they are validly in
a police officer’s custody as long as the officer continues to interrogate them. The police
officer retains the upper hand and the accoutrements of authority. That the officer lacks
legal license to continue to detain them is unknown to most citizens, and a reasonable
person would not feel free to walk away as the officer continues to address him.” 73 Ohio
St. 3d, at 655, 653 N.E.2d, at 698 . . . . The fact that this particular officer successfully
used a similar method of obtaining consent to search roughly 786 times in one
year, State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App. 3d 586, 591592, 639 N.E.2d 498, 502, dism’d, 69
Ohio St. 3d 1488, 635 N.E.2d 43 (1994), indicates that motorists generally respond in a
manner that is contrary to their self-interest. Repeated decisions by ordinary citizens to
surrender that interest cannot satisfactorily be explained on any hypothesis other than an
assumption that they believed they had a legal duty to do so.”)
79
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
73
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that constitute Fourth Amendment “seizures,” 80 the Court moved away
from the Terry approach of highlighting the requirements that officers
must fulfill before intruding on the liberty of individuals.81 Instead, the
language of the Supreme Court increasingly emphasized officers’
freedom to approach and question individuals without any basis in
suspicion, 82 notwithstanding citizens’ evident actual lack of knowledge
about their Fourth Amendment rights.83
In Illinois v. Wardlow, 84 the Supreme Court majority said that
officers’ claim that an individual ran at the sight of police in a “high
crime” area could provide a critical fact for forming the necessary
reasonable suspicion for a stop-and-frisk search. 85 Yet, the majority
opinion ignored the fact that police officers could not know for certain
that the individual was running away from the sight of police officers
since the officers claimed that they could not even remember whether
they were driving down the street in an unmarked car or a clearlyidentifiable, marked police cruiser.86
Moreover, the majority’s
assumption that running is suspicious behavior broadens police authority
without acknowledging the many innocent reasons that someone may
move quickly at any given moment. 87 In addition, notwithstanding the
80
The expressed support for broad, flexible discretionary police authority to intrude on
citizens’ liberty in order to stop them with inquiries and questions, including those that
might lead to a search, was premised on the unproven assumption that citizens’ know that
they can ignore and walk away from police officer blocking their path and posing
questions to them. See generally, Mendenhall v. United States, 446 U.S. at 554. (defining
Fourth Amendment “seizures” quite narrowly).
81
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
82
See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555 (“The events took place in the public concourse.
The agents wore no uniforms, and displayed no weapons. They did not summon the
respondent to their presence, but instead approached her and identified themselves as
federal agents. They requested, but did not demand, to see the respondent’s identification
and ticket. Such conduct, without more, did not amount to an intrusion upon any
constitutionally protected interest.”); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435-38 (1991)
(“Bostick maintains that a reasonable bus passenger would not have felt free to leave
under the circumstances of this case because there is nowhere to go on a bus. Also, the
bus was about to depart. Had Bostick disembarked, he would have risked being stranded
and losing whatever baggage he had locked away in the luggage compartment . . . . [T]he
mere fact that Bostick did not feel free to leave the bus does not mean that the police
seized him . . . . Our Fourth Amendment inquiry in this ease -- whether a reasonable
person would have felt free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter -- applies equally to police encounters that take place on trains, planes, and city
streets.”).
83
See supra note 78.
84
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 (2000).
85
Id. at 125.
86
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 138 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87
See id. at 128–29, 131 (Stevens, J., dissenting): (“A pedestrian may break into a run
for a variety of reasons-to catch up with a friend a block or two away, to seek shelter
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decision’s focus on the suspiciousness of “unprovoked” flight from the
police, the majority appeared to accept that police officers, through their
own behavior, could create the reasonable suspicion that they may desire
by targeting individuals for investigative attention in order to see if the
individuals might run. 88
In other examples of the Supreme Court’s endorsement of expansive
discretionary law enforcement authority to intrude on the liberty of
individuals, the Court approved a traffic stop of a minivan traveling
down a back country road, in part, because children in the van were
waving at the officer in what he regarded as a “mechanical” fashion.89
The Court’s opinion conceded that the conduct of the driver and
passengers could be entirely innocent,90 yet was willing to defer to the
officer’s totality-of-circumstances conclusion that reasonable suspicion
existed despite any articulable facts that pointed specifically to illegal
conduct. 91 The Court also approved officers’ authority to order
passengers out of vehicles during traffic stops without any basis for
suspicion that they had engaged in wrongful conduct. 92 This decision led
Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy, to
complain that “the Court takes the unprecedented step of authorizing
seizures that are unsupported by any individualized suspicion
whatsoever.” 93 When the Court empowered police officers to decide for
themselves whether probable cause existed to search closed containers
within automobiles, Justice Stevens issued a sharp criticism: “It is too
early to know how much freedom America has lost today. The
magnitude of the loss is, however, not nearly as significant as the Court’s

from an impending storm, to arrive at a bus stop before the bus leaves, to get home in
time for dinner, to resume jogging after a pause for rest, to avoid contact with a bore or a
bully, or simply to answer the call of nature-any of which might coincide with the arrival
of an officer in the vicinity [In addition,] a reasonable person may conclude that an
officer’s sudden appearance indicates nearby criminal activity. And where there is
criminal activity there is also a substantial element of danger-either from the criminal or
from a confrontation between the criminal and the police. These considerations can lead
to an innocent and understandable desire to quit the vicinity with all speed.”).
88
See id. at 130 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Nowhere in Illinois’ briefs does it specify
what it means by ‘unprovoked.’ At oral argument, Illinois explained that if officers
precipitate a flight by threats of violence, that flight is ‘provoked.’ But if police officers
in a patrol car-with lights flashing and siren sounding-descend upon an individual for the
sole purpose of seeing if he or she will run, the ensuing flight is ‘unprovoked.’”).
89
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002).
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997).
93
Id. at 422 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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willingness to inflict it without even a colorable basis for its rejection of
prior law.” 94
In addition, the Court also approved the stop of a vehicle based on an
anonymous tip 95 even when officers following the vehicle did not
personally observe any suspicious conduct or traffic violations.96 In
another decision, the Roberts Court supported the permissibility of a
vehicle stop even when the officer wrongly believed that his state’s law
had been violated by the vehicle’s equipment. 97 In effect, it was a stop
that was not based on any legal reason, 98 leading one commentator to
quip that “ignorance of the law is no excuse for breaking the law—unless
you’re a police officer.” 99 The cumulative effect of such decisions
affecting pedestrians and drivers led Professor David Rudovsky to
observe that “the power of police stop and frisk has greatly expanded and
now encompasses all suspected criminal activity, no matter how trivial,
and under circumstances where the conduct observed may be fully
consistent with innocence.” 100

B. Insufficient Recognition of the Problems of Racial
Discrimination
The Supreme Court’s decisions have made it difficult to prove the
existence of racial discrimination in the decisions of criminal justice
officials. 101 For example, in McCleskey v. Kemp, 102 the Court rejected an
equal protection challenge to the death penalty system in Georgia based
on strong statistical evidence indicating the existence of racial
discrimination.103 Justice Lewis Powell’s majority opinion said statistics
cannot be used to prove the existence of racial discrimination for capital
94

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 602 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Prado Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014).
96
Id. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014).
98
Mark Joseph Stern, The Ferguson Effect, SLATE (April 21, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/04/rodriguez_v_unit
ed_states_a_huge_win_against_police_overreach_at_the_supreme.html.
99
Id.
100
David Rudovsky, Stop-and-Frisk: The Power of Data and the Decision in Floyd v.
City of New York, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 117, 118 (2013).
101
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (studies showing statistically
significant racial disparities in the application of the death penalty cannot be used to
prove the existence of racial discrimination in a state’s capital cases); See also United
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (holding that anecdotal evidence of disparate
treatment by race in criminal prosecutions is insufficient to justify existing evidence to
determine whether racial discrimination exists).
102
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279.
103
Id. at 292.
95
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prosecutions 104 even though such evidence is accepted for proving racial
discrimination in the presumably less-important, non-life-and-death
contexts of jury selection and employment discrimination.105 Justice
Powell justified the rejection of using statistics to prove discrimination in
criminal justice by the asserted need to preserve broad discretionary
authority for officials’ decisions in the context of criminal justice.106 As
Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, members of the majority seemed
more concerned with preserving capital punishment and discretionary
decision-making than with stamping out equal protection violations in
the criminal justice system. 107 Despite widely-recognized research
establishing the existence of racial bias in decision-making, 108 the
Court’s decision seemed to preclude any finding of an equal protection
violation in the context of criminal justice, no matter how glaring the
racial disparities in treatment and outcomes, except in the unlikely event
that “decision makers openly express their biases.” 109 Thus, the majority
opinion “facilitated an expansion in discretion and concomitant
discrimination in applying capital punishment.”110
A further limitation on proving the existence of racial discrimination
came from United States v. Armstrong. 111 Defense attorneys brought
forth anecdotal information about a federal prosecutor’s office that
apparently only prosecuted minority group members and never whites
for crack cocaine crimes despite whites’ use of the drug within that
jurisdiction. 112 The attorneys sought access to records that would enable
them to learn whether this anecdotal information indicated the existence
of improper racial discrimination by the prosecutor’s office.113 However,
the Court barred access to the prosecutor’s records that would have
provided a basis for discovering whether discrimination occurred. 114
Instead of treating racial discrimination in criminal prosecution as a
scourge that must be eradicated at every opportunity, the majority
104

Id. at 292–93 (“[T]o prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey must
prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose. He offers no
evidence specific to his own case that would support an inference that racial
considerations played a part in his sentence.”).
105
Id. at 293–94.
106
Smith, supra note 32, at 76–78.
107
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108
See Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme Court and Ethnicity, 69 OR. L. REV. 797,
830 (1990).
109
Id.
110
Smith, supra note 32, at 76.
111
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
112
Id. at 460–61.
113
Id. at 459.
114
Id. at 470.
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maintained difficult-to-establish standards for pursuing selective
prosecution claims. 115 In his dissent, Justice Stevens pointed to the
demonstrated differential impact of sentencing for crack cocaine
convictions as opposed to powder cocaine convictions, 116 with severe
consequences for African American defendants who predominated
among those given long prison sentences for crack cocaine offenses. 117
Justice Stevens argued that it was proper for judges to open examinations
of racially-discriminatory selective prosecutions because “Evidence
tending to prove that black defendants charged with distribution of
crack . . . are prosecuted in federal court, whereas members of other
races charged with similar offenses are prosecuted in state court,
warrants close scrutiny by the federal judges in that District.” 118
The Supreme Court’s decisions in McCleskey and Armstrong raise
fears that a critical mass of justices may share Justice Scalia’s view that
racial discrimination is an “ineradicable” problem in the criminal justice
system and therefore, the Court should not bother with trying to address
it. 119 Justice Scalia revealed his viewpoint in an internal memorandum to
the other justices during the Court’s consideration of the McCleskey case,
a memorandum that became public when a professor discovered it after
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s papers were made available at the Library
of Congress after his death in 1993.120 In Scalia’s words, “Since it is my
view that the unconscious operation of irrational sympathies and
antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence)
prosecutorial [ones] is real, acknowledged by the [cases] of this court and
ineradicable, I cannot honestly say that all I need is more proof [of
discrimination].” 121 Justice Scalia’s subsequent vote with the McCleskey
majority to reject the use of powerful statistical evidence for proving the
existence of equal protection violations led one commentator to observe
that Scalia’s memorandum “trivialize[ed] [discriminatory practices] by

115

Id. at 463–69.
Id. at 478–80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117
See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS 112–19, 188 (2010) (racial discrimination and adverse consequences
for African American defendants and offenders in the criminal justice system, including
severe impact of differential sentencing for cocaine offenses).
118
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 480 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119
Smith, supra note 32, at 79–80.
120
See Dennis Dorin, Far Right of the Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies from
the Perspective of Justice Antonin Scalia’s McCleskey Memorandum, 45 MERCER L. REV.
1035 (1994) (discussion of the discovery, content, and implications of Justice Scalia’s
memorandum).
121
SMITH, supra note 32, at 80.
116
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saying, in a single-paragraph, that they were merely an unavoidable and
legally unassailable, part of life for African-Americans.” 122
In his opinion, concurring in part, and dissenting in part in Illinois v.
Wardlow, 123 concerning stop-and-frisk searches, Justice Stevens pointed
his colleagues to the real-world experiences of African Americans who
encounter police officers.124 The majority concluded that when the
police see someone run as officers drive down a street, such behavior
can be considered an important element of reasonable suspicion to justify
a stop-and-frisk search. 125 Justice Stevens, by contrast, noted that
“[a]mong some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing in
high crime areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing person is
entirely innocent, but, with or without justification, believes that contact
with the police can itself be dangerous, apart from any criminal activity
associated with the officer’s sudden presence.” 126 Justice Stevens also
cited various surveys about African Americans’ perceptions of
discrimination by police as well as officers’ own admissions about the
potential existence of bias.127 In a footnote, Stevens expressed concern
about the need to “account for the experiences of many citizens of this
country, particularly those who are minorities” in evaluating encounters
between individuals and police.128 In light of his other words and
footnotes, he clearly did not believe that his colleagues in the majority
had adequately understood and accounted for the experiences of minority
group members. 129 Thus, racially-discriminatory behavior can be
practiced by the police in stopping individuals and, “[s]o long as officers
refrain from uttering racial epithets and so long as they show the good
sense not to say ‘the only reason I stopped him was ‘cause he’s black,’
courts generally turn a blind eye to patterns of discrimination by the
police.” 130
Decades ago, the Supreme Court presented a powerful, widelyrecognized voice against racial discrimination with its pronouncements
concerning impermissible racial segregation and discrimination in
American society 131 as well as in criminal justice processes. 132
122

Dorin, supra note 120, at 1077.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
124
See id. at 132 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
125
See id. at 124.
126
Id. at 132 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127
Id. at 132–33 nn.7–9.
128
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 129 n.3 (2000).
129
See id.
130
ALEXANDER, supra note 117, at 133.
131
See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (interpretation of statute to
prohibit racial discrimination by certain private schools); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964) (endorsement of congressional power to prohibit racial discrimination by
123
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Arguably, the Supreme Court was the most visible “public actor clothed
with the appearance of legitimacy, neutrality, and principle to . . .
advance equality.” 133 Today, there is a question as to whether police
officers and other justice system officials have any reason to perceive the
Supreme Court as communicating strong concerns about racial
discrimination against African Americans and other minorities. 134
Indeed, Professor Michelle Alexander argues that “[b]ecause the
Supreme Court has authorized the police to use race as a factor when
making decisions regarding whom to stop and search, police departments
believe that racial profiling exists only when race is the sole factor”
(emphasis in original). 135 As a result, rather than receive a message
about the need to take care to avoid race-based, discriminatory decision
making, police officers have instead perceived the Court to say that “if
race is one factor [in a stop and search] but not the only factor, then it
doesn’t really count as a factor at all.”136 Yet, as Professor Alexander
observes, “[t]he problem is that although race is rarely the sole reason for
a stop and search, it is frequently a determinative reason” (emphasis in
original). 137
The most prominent messages presented by the contemporary
Supreme Court majority imply that racial discrimination in American
society is primarily a problem of the past and that heightened sensitivity
and remedial measures are no longer needed. 138 When the Supreme
Court majority blocked recent school integration measures in Seattle and

certain private businesses); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (unconstitutionality of
racial segregation in federally-administered public schools due to the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(unconstitutionality of racial segregation in states’ public schools due to the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause).
132
See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (approval of hiring requirements
to remedy racial discrimination in employment by a police agency); Lee v. Washington,
390 U.S. 333 (1968) (prohibition on Alabama’s use of racial segregation in correctional
institutions).
133
Smith, supra note 108, at 844.
134
See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 117, at 131 (“The [Supreme] Court’s quiet
blessing of race-based traffic stops has led to something of an Orwellian public discourse
regarding racial profiling.”).
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 34 (2012) (“Others, including some current
members of the Supreme Court, see anxiety about [police] discretion and worries about
racially biased policing as products of a distinctive period in our history; they argue that
these concerns have been rendered obsolete by progress in race relations.”).
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Louisville, 139 Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion pointed directly to the
contrast between the Court’s prior role in providing guidance on
counteracting discrimination and the contemporary change in a contrary
direction: “Yesterday, the citizens of this nation could look for guidance
to this Court’s unanimous pronouncements concerning desegregation.
Today, they cannot. Yesterday, school boards had available to them a
full range of means to combat segregated schools. Today, they do
not.” 140
A separate dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens underscored the
change in the Court’s position and role on matters of race by saying,
“The Court has changed significantly since . . . 1968. It was then more
faithful to Brown . . . It is my firm conviction that no member of the
Court that joined in 1975 would have agreed with today’s decision.”141
Other decisions by the contemporary Court, such as proactively reducing
the impact of the Voting Rights Act’s protections against
discrimination 142 and raising impediments for people wishing to file
employment discrimination claims, 143 have similarly reduced its image
as an institution committed to counteracting racial discrimination.144
Thus, the contemporary Court majority is susceptible to the same
criticism that Justice Harry Blackmun applied to his colleagues after the
Court’s major shift toward conservatism in the 1970s and 1980s: “One
wonders whether the majority still believes that race discrimination—or,
more accurately, race discrimination against non-whites—is a problem in
our society, or even remembers that it ever was.” 145

C. Shift in Perspective to De-Emphasize Remedies for Rights
Violations
The changes in the Supreme Court’s composition after the rightsprotective Warren Court era contributed to expansions in police authority
that invite suspicionless stops and race-based assertions of police
139

Parents Involved in Community Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007).
140
See id. at 865 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
141
See id. at 803 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142
Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013).
143
Vance v. Ball St. Univ,, 133 S.Ct. 2434 (2013).
144
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Invalidates Key Part of Voting Rights Act,
N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2013) (Prior to striking down Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act in
2013, “[t]he Supreme Court had repeatedly upheld the law in earlier decisions, saying
that the preclearance requirement was an effective tool to combat the legacy of lawless
conduct by Southern officials bent on denying voting rights to blacks.”),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/us/supreme-court-ruling.html.
145
Ward’s Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 662 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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power. 146 In particular, the Court majority evinced a shift in perspective
from focusing on preventing and remedying rights violations during the
Warren Court 147 era to focusing on whether police did anything
wrong. 148 The new perspective in the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts
Court eras forgives officers for good faith errors, creates exceptions to
previously-established rules, and thereby fails to remedy rights
violations. 149
For example, when police conduct unjustified searches in reliance on
judges’ errors in issuing warrants, 150 errors in police databases, 151 errors
in court databases, 152 and misperceptions about whether an individual has
actual authority to consent to a search of a residence, 153 officials are
allowed to use incriminating evidence found in those searches despite
violations of Fourth Amendment rights.154 Under the perspective driving
decisions since the end of the Warren Court era, the question of
providing remedies for rights violations “turns on the culpability of the
police,” 155 not on the question of whether rights violations occurred. 156
Such rulings may decrease incentives for police to gather as much
information as possible since they can gain the benefit of broadened
search authority by claiming ignorance of all relevant facts and therefore
use self-interested ignorance to avoid culpability for rights violations.157
146

See Smith, supra note 32, at 6–29.
Id. at 12, 36.
148
SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 41, at 102.
149
Id. at 102–107. In the Burger Court era, see, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897 (1984) (holding that officers could use evidence from an improper search based on a
warrant improperly issued by a judicial officer). In the Rehnquist Court era, see, e.g.,
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (holding that police officers could use incriminating
evidence found incident to an arrest even though the arrest was based on a nonexistent
warrant erroneously recorded in a court database). In the Roberts Court era, see, e.g.,
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (holding that police officers could use
incriminating evidence found incident to an arrest even though the arrest was based on a
nonexistent warrant erroneously recorded in a law enforcement database).
150
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
151
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
152
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
153
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
154
See SMITH, supra note 41, at 98, 102, 105.
155
Herring, 555 U.S. at 135.
156
See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that a Fourth
Amendment violation occurred when a search warrant was issued based on stale
information that could not constitute probable cause, but the evidence found during the
improper search could be used to prosecute the defendant because a judicial officer rather
than the police was responsible for the error.).
157
See id. at 955 (Brennan, J., dissenting). (“If evidence is consistently excluded in
these circumstances, police departments will surely be prompted to instruct their officers
to devote greater care and attention to providing sufficient information to establish
probable cause when applying for a warrant, and to review with some attention the form
147
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This emphasis on overlooking police errors that lead to intrusions on
individuals’ liberty recently expanded even further with the Court’s 2014
decision in Heien v. North Carolina permitting traffic stops that may lead
to a search to be based on an officer’s erroneous assumption about
possessing the authority to enforce a nonexistent statute. 158
The creation of exceptions to the Warren Court’s rights-protective
rulings 159 and the recognition of increasing numbers of situations for
which the Supreme Court approves warrantless searches 160 expanded
police discretionary authority and contributed to the risk of abuses. 161
Moreover, by providing a variety of avenues for after-the-fact
manufactured narratives to rationalize unjustified stops, searches and
decisions to use force, 162 Supreme Court decisions enable dishonest
police officers to hide from judicial scrutiny their knowingly improper
and race-based discretionary intrusions on individuals’ liberties.163
of the warrant that they have been issued, rather than automatically assuming that
whatever document the magistrate has signed will necessarily comport with Fourth
Amendment requirements. After today’s decisions, however, that institutional incentive
will be lost. Indeed, the Court’s ‘reasonable mistake’ exception to the exclusionary rule
will tend to put a premium on police ignorance of the law.”).
158
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S.Ct. 530 (2014).
159
See CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 26 (4th ed. 2000) (“Most important in this regard
has been the Court’s inexorable movement toward the position that the exclusionary rule
should not apply when police are ‘reasonably’ unaware they are violating Fourth
Amendment principles . . . .”). See also HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 34, at 448
(“However, the landmark precedent [Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 644 (1961)] had begun to
experience a ‘swiss cheese’ effect as the Burger Court created exceptions that
increasingly permitted improperly obtain evidence to be used against criminal
defendants.”).
160
Categories of permissible warrantless searches resting on police discretion rather the
approval of a judicial officer include stop-and-frisk, exigent circumstances, incident to an
arrest, and various scenarios involving automobiles. SMITH, supra note 41, at 100–107.
161
New York City’s widespread stop-and-frisk practices targeting young minority men
for hundreds of thousands of suspicionless stops represent the kind of abuse that can
follow from widening opportunities for discretionary, warrantless searches. See supra
notes 56–64 and accompanying text.
162
See, e.g., WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 159, at 46 (“The elasticity of the
majority’s standard [for the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule]
creates significant potential for . . . at worst encouraging police to take illegal shortcuts in
the belief that legal investigatory methods can be imagined by the time of the suppression
hearing.”).
163
For example, police officers who have found incriminating evidence during an
improper search have a period time from the search or arrest until preliminary hearings in
court to create a description of a situation or event that may, for example, let them claim
that they had sufficient reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop-and-frisk search or that
exigent circumstances required them to take immediate action—whether or not that
actual description is true. See Benjamin Weiser, Police in Gun Searches Face Disbelief in
Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2008) at B1.
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An additional aspect of deficiencies in the Supreme Court’s
protection of rights can be seen in rulings that make it difficult to hold
criminal justice officials accountable for possible rights violations. In
Scott v. Harris, 164 for example, based on the justices’ own subjective
interpretation of a police-car video of the chase, the Supreme Court ruled
that a fleeing speeder who was permanently disabled when his car was
intentionally rammed by a police cruiser at high speed could not proceed
to trial in his lawsuit against the police.165 In his dissent, Justice Stevens
criticized the majority for usurping the role of a jury by making a factfinding determination in a case for which the police arguably did not
need to give chase and cause the victim to flee because the police had the
speeder’s license plate number and could simply have gone to his home
to ticket or arrest him. 166 The Supreme Court took the same approach in
a subsequent case in which police officers fired fifteen bullets into a
vehicle, killing both the driver and a passenger, after the driver sped
away from a traffic stop. 167 In both cases, the Court denied any
opportunity for the police liability claims to go to trial even though lower
courts had ordered that the claims be presented to juries. 168 In such useof-force cases, other avenues of accountability can be blocked by police
departments’ relationships with prosecutors when prosecutors use their
discretionary authority to decline to pursue criminal charges against
officers, even in troubling cases that result in the deaths of innocent
individuals under questionable circumstances. 169 Prosecutors can also
orchestrate the grand jury proceedings to protect police officers from
prosecution. 170
In another example concerning accountability through civil liability,
the Roberts Court strengthened prosecutorial immunity, even under
shocking circumstances, by overturning a $14 million jury verdict won
164

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
Id. at 384–86.
166
Id. at 389–97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S.Ct. 2012 (2014).
168
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. at 372 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Plumhoff, 132 S. Ct. at
2012. See Adam Liptak, Justices Unite on Key Point in Chase Ending in Fatal Police
Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (Mar 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/05/us/justicesseem-united-on-key-argument-in-fatal-police-chase.html.
169
See, e.g., Tony Pipitone, Miami-Dade Police Launch Criminal Investigation Into
Missing Evidence; No Discipline for Officers in Redland Killings, NBC MIAMI (Mar. 21,
2015), http://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/Miami-Dade-Police-Launch-Criminal-In
vestigation-Into-Missing-Evidence-No-Discipline-for-Officers-in-Redland-Killings297080891.html (prosecutors decline to prosecute police officers for shooting police
informant and three burglars under circumstances in which video evidence showed a
victim raise his hands to surrender and none of the victims had a rifle as reported by
police).
170
See supra note 12, and accompanying text.
165
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by a man who spent many years on death row due to prosecutorial
misconduct involving hiding and destroying exculpatory evidence. 171
Police typically work closely with prosecutors and may be involved in
hiding or distorting evidence that might have cast doubt on a particular
defendant’s guilt. 172 According to the Supreme Court, “the individual
prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the
others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the
police.” 173 Because it is prosecutors rather than police who are supposed
to have obligations under Brady v. Maryland 174for sharing exculpatory
evidence with defense attorneys, prosecutorial responsibility and
immunity may effectively shield police, as when claims are directed at
immunity-protected prosecutors for information never revealed by
police. 175
In addition, the Supreme Court has further contributed to criminal
justices officials’ avoidance of accountability and consequences in
certain situations, such as the failure to preserve evidence that might be
favorable to the defendant, by requiring the defendant to prove “bad
faith” on the part of police in order to prove a rights violation.176 The
Court’s failure to make police responsible for preserving evidence led,
for example, to a Denver Post investigation that found 141 cases in
which Colorado police and prosecutors destroyed evidence that
convicted offenders sought to have tested. 177 In one Colorado case, in
violation of their own department’s policies and a court order, police
tossed into a dumpster DNA evidence labeled “DO NOT DESTROY”
171

Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350 (2011).
See, e.g., Joaquin Sapien, Watching the Detectives: Will Probe of Cop’s Cases
Extend to Prosecutors?, PRO PUBLICA (June 21, 2013, 9:52 AM)
http://www.propublica.org/
article/watching-the-detectives-will-probe-of-cops-cases-extend-to-prosecutors
(Brooklyn detective worked closely with prosecutors for many years before having
several murder convictions reexamined and overturned after defendants had served years
in prison).
173
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).
174
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
175
See, e.g., Robert S. Mahler, Extracting the Gate Key: Litigating Brady Issues, NATL.
ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS (May 2001) at n.3, http://www.nacdl.org/Champion
.aspx?id=22712 (“Professor Rosen’s article . . . had no occasion to address the times
when exculpatory information in possession of law enforcement agencies was never
disclosed to either the defense or the prosecutor . . . “).
176
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988).
177
Susan Greene & Miles Moffeit, Bad Faith Difficult to Prove: Through Carelessness
or by Design, Tiny Biological Samples Holding Crucial DNA Fingerprints Often
Disappear on Authorities’ Watch. Innocent People Languish in Prison, and Criminals
Walk Free, DENVER POST (July 22, 2007), http://www.denverpost.com/evidence/ci_
6429277.
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and thereby stopped a prisoner from seeking to prove his innocence.178
Nationally-known criminal defense attorney Abe Hutt said about his
client in that case:
You don’t scream about your innocence from a jail cell
for 10 years and finally get the money together to have
this stuff tested only to have so many people at the
police department be careless, negligent, bad faith,
reckless, whatever you want to call it, and thereby
destroy forever your ability to prove your innocence and
then have a court look at you and say, well, tough, that’s
kind of the way it goes. 179
The issue of holding police responsible for preserving evidence may
seem distant from the post-Ferguson debates about excessive use of
force, improper stops and searches, and race-based discriminatory
decisions by police.180 Yet, in reality, this issue provides further
evidence that the Supreme Court’s decisions may have facilitated, and
perhaps even encouraged, police officers and other criminal justice
officials to freely act with impunity in the absence of any fear of
accountability and adverse consequences.181

III.

CONCLUSION

It is unquestionably true that seeking to prevent and remedy the
wrongs evident in the pervasive problem of unjustified police stops,
searches, and uses of force against African American men in every strata
of society 182 will require action by officials throughout the justice
178

Id.
Id.
180
Issues about evidence preservation arise during or after criminal prosecutions while
debates about the Ferguson, Missouri, shooting of Michael Brown and other controversial
police use-of-force incidents against unarmed African Americans concern police
encounters prior to prosecution. See supra notes 1–11, and accompanying text.
181
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, MADHAVI MCCALL, & CYNTHIA PEREZ
MCCLUSKEY, LAW AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EMERGING ISSUES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 32–33 (2005) (“Because of the [Supreme] Court’s reputation for conservatism
and consistent record of generally endorsing expanded governmental powers in criminal
justice, police officers, prosecutors, corrections officials, and lower court judges may feel
encouraged to push and test the limitations created by prior precedents. Their
observations and experiences may indicate to them that the Rehnquist Court is likely to
eliminate, diminish, or create exceptions to rights-enforcing rules established in prior
Supreme Court decisions.”).
182
Racially discriminatory actions by police officers do not merely affect the politically
powerless people in poor communities such as Ferguson, Mo. Such actions are an ever179
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system. 183 Moreover, progress will require the cultivation of greater
tolerance, self-awareness, and honesty within future police officers
among American young people through lifelong developmental
processes affected by school systems, news media, and other broad
societal influences. 184 The U.S. Supreme Court also has a role to play in
addressing the problems that are at the forefront of public consciousness
following the events in Ferguson, Missouri, and elsewhere in reaction to
police violence.185 The Court played a key role in facilitating recent
injustices and tragedies 186 and, although it cannot cure pervasive
present fact of life for African American graduates of Harvard and other elites. See
Christopher E. Smith, What I Learned About Stop-and-Frisk from Watching My Black
ATLANTIC
(Apr.
1,
2014),
Son,
THE
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/04/what-i-learned-about-stop-andfrisk-from-watching-my-black-son/359962/ (describing Harvard student’s experience
when targeted by New York City stop-and-frisk practices); See also, Byronn Bain,
Walking While Black: The Bill of Rights for Black Men, THE VILLAGE VOICE (Apr. 25,
2000), http://www.villagevoice.com/2000-04-25/news/walking-while-black (detailing
unjust arrest of a Harvard Law School student walking down the sidewalk in New York
City).
183
For example, essential elements of reform must include closer supervision and
skepticism by trial judges who evaluate police officers’ rationalizations for their actions.
Weiser, supra note 162. Reforms must also include police administrators’ allocation of
resources for purchasing and monitoring effective body camera systems. Stav Ziv, Study
Finds Body Camera Reduce Police’s Use of Force, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 28, 2014, 2:31 PM)
http://www.newsweek.com/amidst-debate-study-finds-body-cameras-decrease-policesuse-force-295315.
184
See, e.g., David Brandwein & Christopher Donoghue, A Multicultural Grassroots
Effort to Reduce Ethnic & Racial Social Distance among Middle School Students, 19
MULTICULTURAL ED. 38 (2012) (detailing study of program designed to increase racial
tolerance among school children).
185
For example, virtually every year the Supreme Court considers and issues decisions
on Fourth Amendment issues that inform law enforcement officials about how to train
and supervise their officers. In the 2012–2013 Supreme Court Term, for example, the
justices issued five widely-discussed decisions concerning the Fourth Amendment:
Florida v. Harris, 133 S.Ct. 1050 (2013) (rejection of challenge to drug-sniffing dog’s
training and certification); Bailey v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1031 (2013) (limitation on
police authority to stop and frisk a suspect who was a distance away from where a search
warrant was being executed at his residence); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409 (2013)
(an officer’s intentional investigatory act of bringing a drug-sniffing dog to the front
porch of a home was a “search” that requires a warrant or other recognized justification
for a reasonable Fourth Amendment search); Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958 (2013)
(approval of DNA sample swabs involuntarily taken from arrestees under state law);
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013) (normally police should seek a warrant
when they want to have blood drawn to test blood alcohol level of suspected drunk
driver). See also, Michael A. McCall, Madhavi M. McCall & Christopher E. Smith,
Criminal Justice and the 2012–2013 United States Supreme Court Term, 5 CHARLOTTE L.
REV. 35 (2014) (description and analysis of U.S. Supreme Court’s criminal justice
decisions).
186
See supra notes 61–180, and accompanying text.
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problems that reflect the nation’s long history of racial bias and
discrimination, 187 its symbolic voice and rule-making authority can
contribute to aspects of needed police reforms. 188
We need a Supreme Court that is skeptical of police officers, their
potential biases, their potential self-interested motives, and their
honesty. 189 The foregoing statement should not be construed as fulfilling
Rudolph Giuliani’s phony political statement about President Obama in
which Giuliani claimed that the president spread “propaganda” telling
“everybody to hate the police.”190 It is merely a recognition that the
nation needs to see the Court return to James Madison’s observation in
Federalist No. 51 that “If men were angels, no government would be
necessary.” 191 In this regard, the specific governmental need is for
stricter judicial rulemaking, skepticism, and scrutiny regarding the
inherently imperfect, “non-angel” human beings who are law
enforcement officers. 192 As Professor Stephen Schulhofer has explained,
187

Even when the Supreme Court speaks strongly against racial discrimination, its
action alone has limited impact on curing such a deeply entrenched problem. See
ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 250–68 (1987) (discussion of the
years’ long challenge of ending racial segregation in public schools even after the
Supreme Court outlawed the practice in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
188
See, e.g., CAROLYN N. LONG, MAPP V. OHIO: GUARDING AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (2006) (“Despite complaining bitterly about Mapp v. Ohio,
police, whether they like it or not, had to change their way of conducting searches . . . .
Other jurisdictions observed how Mapp prompted the law enforcement community to
professionalize its officers.”).
189
See Judge Says Remarks on ‘Gorillas’ May Be Cited in Trial on Beating, N.Y.
TIMES (Jun. 12, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/12/us/judge-says-remarks-ongorillas-may-be-cited-in-trial-on-beating.html, for an example of police officers’ selfinterested motives, and instances of dishonesty. (Reporting that the prevalence of
recording devices regularly provides evidence of individual police officers’ biases, such
as officers in the Rodney King beating and their radio transmission references to
gorillas); Attorney: Officer Who Shot Man Saturday Believes He Followed Proper
4
NEWS
(Apr.
5,
2015,
4:52
PM),
Procedure,
ABC
http://www.abcnews4.com/story/28725562/coroner-identifies-man-shot-killed-by-northcharleston-police-officer. (With respect to individual officers’ honesty, in the immediate
aftermath of the North Charleston, South Carolina, shooting of Walter Scott, Officer
Michael Slager claimed that Scott had taken the officer’s Taser in a struggle and implied
that he had to shoot in self-defense.); William M. Welch, S.C. Police Officer Charged in
TODAY
(Apr.
8,
2015,
2:39
PM),
Fatal
Shooting,
USA
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/04/07/charges-in-sc-police-shooting/2543
0473/ (However, the video of the incident taken by on a cellphone by a bystander showed
Scott running away with the Taser, with which he had been shot, trailing along behind
him as Officer Slager shot him the back while firing multiple times.).
190
Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Giuliani’s Claim that Obama Launched Anti-Police
Propaganda, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/factchecker/wp/2014/12/23/giulianis-claim-that-obama-launched-anti-police-propaganda/.
191
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
192
See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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a key trend that facilitated the problems illustrated by the Ferguson
shooting and other recent events concerns the commitment of the
Supreme Court’s majority since the end of the Warren Court era to be
overly trusting of police officers: 193
A similar inversion of Fourth Amendment values—
positing police trustworthiness and resisting judicial
oversight—is reflected in the Court’s recent attitude
toward remedies for a Fourth Amendment violation . . .
On this subject as on so many others, the Court is once
again turning our Fourth Amendment tradition and the
commitments of the Framers inside out. The claim that
law enforcement can be trusted to follow the law is of
course politically appealing, and no doubt most police
officers are persons of goodwill and decent intentions.
Nonetheless, the premise that such probity will persist
without independent checks, and that executive officers
can be trusted to exercise search-and-seizure powers
fairly, in the absence of judicial oversight, is precisely
the assumption that the Fourth Amendment rejects.194
During prior eras, there were justices on the Court whose personal
exposure to abusive police conduct taught them that police need firm,
strong rules in order for individuals’ rights to be protected. Justice
Thurgood Marshall was nearly lynched by police officers in Tennessee
when he was a roving civil rights attorney in the South prior to his
judicial career.195 In his youth, Justice William Brennan saw his laborunion-organizer father beaten bloody by the police. 196 Looking back on
his career as an attorney, Justice John Paul Stevens was never able to
forget a client’s description of being brutally beaten by the Chicago
police until he confessed to a murder that he did not commit. 197 Without
personal experiences of their own with abusive police conduct,
contemporary justices need to look closely at the nature and number of
controversial police incidents that emerge with unfortunate regularity as
the means to remind themselves that it is a mistake to facilitate the risk of

193

SCHULHOFER, supra note 138, at 66–67.
Id.
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JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 131–32, 139–
40 (1998).
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abuse by being too trusting of the imperfect human beings who serve as
police officers. 198
We need a Supreme Court that seeks to understand the lives of all
Americans, rich and poor, so that the Court’s decisions will not make
erroneous assumptions as a means to defer to police actions.199 For
example, why assume that someone running in a poor neighborhood is
guiltily fleeing from the police rather than understand that the arrival of
the police in such areas may mean that something bad is happening and
careful citizens would be wise to leave the area? 200 Why assume that
Americans know that they can say “no” when police officers ask for
consent to search their vehicles? 201 Why assume that Americans know
that they can say “no” when asked by police officers to accompany the
officers to an office at the airport? 202 If the Court majority is incapable
of seeking a realistic view of people’s possible innocent motives and
deficiencies in knowledge, there is a grave risk that the Court effectively
abdicates its judicial role in favor of lending its authority and power to
the effort to combat crime at the cost of constitutional rights.203
198

See supra notes 1–15 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (assuming that seated bus
passengers are sufficiently aware of their rights to know that they can decline to answer
police officers’ questions and terminate the officers’ inquiries).
200
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 131 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“[A] reasonable person may conclude that an officer’s sudden
appearance indicates nearby criminal activity. And where there is criminal activity there
is also a substantial element of danger-either from the criminal or from a confrontation
between the criminal and the police. These considerations can lead to an innocent and
understandable desire to quit the vicinity with all speed.”).
201
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 48 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The fact that
this particular officer successfully used a similar method of obtaining consent to search
roughly 786 times in one year . . . indicates that motorists generally respond in a manner
that is contrary to their self-interest. Repeated decisions by ordinary citizens to surrender
that interest cannot satisfactorily be explained on any hypothesis other than an
assumption that they believed they had a legal duty to do so.”).
202
See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 577 (White, J., dissenting)
(“On the record before us, the Court’s conclusion can only be based on the notion that
consent can be assumed from the absence of proof that a suspect resisted police authority.
This is a notion that we have squarely rejected.”).
203
Justice Stevens was critical of the Court’s majority that granted police officers the
authority to make their own determinations of probable to justify searches of containers
inside automobiles. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 601 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). (“No impartial observer could criticize this Court for hindering the progress
of the war on drugs. On the contrary, decisions like the one this Court makes today will
support the conclusion that this Court has become a loyal foot soldier in the Executive’s
fight against crime. Even if the warrant requirement does inconvenience the police to
some extent, that fact does not distinguish this constitutional requirement from any other
procedural protection secured by the Bill of Rights. It is merely a part of the price that our
society must pay in order to preserve its freedom.”)
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In addition, we need justices to have greater awareness of the
continuing problems of racial discrimination and the salience of race for
triggering adverse treatment of young men, in particular, at the hands of
the police. 204 There is plenty of empirical evidence to demonstrate this
reality. 205 Moreover, they need only listen to the words of their
colleague Justice Sotomayor to learn about the impact of race and
ethnicity in American society. 206 They need to learn from her words and
experience that “Race also matters because of persistent racial inequality
in society—inequality that has produced stark socioeconomic
disparities” 207 and that their responsibility is to “apply the Constitution
with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of racial
discrimination.” 208
There are individual cases in which the majority of contemporary
Roberts Court justices identify needed limitations on police officers’
discretionary actions involving stops and searches, 209 such as the 2015
decision in Rodriguez v. United States barring police officers from
holding drivers after a completed traffic stop without a basis for
reasonable suspicion. 210 Such individual decisions are necessary but
woefully insufficient as a means for the Court to play its needed role
because police officers must see the nation’s highest court consistently
204

See supra notes 1–15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 56–64 and accompanying text.
206
See Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1676
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Race also matters because of persistent racial inequality in
society—inequality that cannot be ignored and that has produced stark socioeconomic
disparities. . . . Race matters to a young man’s view of society when he spends his
teenage years watching others tense up as he passes, no matter the neighborhood where
he grew up. Race matters to a young woman’s sense of self when she states her
hometown, and then is pressed, “No, where are you really from?” regardless of how
many generations her family has been in the country . . . . Race matters because of the
slights, the snickers, the silent judgments that reinforce that most crippling of thoughts: “I
do not belong here.” In my colleagues’ view, examining the racial impact of legislation
only perpetuates racial discrimination. This refusal to accept the stark reality that race
matters is regrettable. The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to speak
openly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply the Constitution with eyes open
to the unfortunate effects of centuries of racial discrimination. As members of the
judiciary tasked with intervening to carry out the guarantee of equal protection, we ought
not sit back and wish away, rather than confront, the racial inequality that exists in our
society . . . “).
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
See Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014) (forbidding warrantless searches of a
driver’s cellphone based solely on the arrest of the driver); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct.
1409 (2013) (holding that police officers who bring a drug-sniffing dog to the porch of a
home are engaged in a search and therefore need a warrant or an appropriate warrantless
search justification).
210
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015).
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display a strong commitment to eradicating racial discrimination and
properly limiting officers’ discretionary authority. 211
Given the
unthoughtful statements made by members of the contemporary Court’s
conservative majority related to race,212 crime, 213 and police power, 214
there is little reason for optimism about the Roberts Court’s role in the
nation’s current post-Ferguson efforts to address glaring problems with
police practices. 215 Indeed, there is little likelihood that the Court will
play its needed role unless and until election results for the White House
and U.S. Senate coincide with justices’ retirements in a manner that leads
211

The Supreme Court can have a powerful symbolic voice when, as described by
Laurence Tribe, “the Court exert[s] the one thing it clearly can control—its rightsdeclaration powers . . . .” Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space:
What Lawyers Can Learn From Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30 (1989).
212
For example, when the Supreme Court considered an issue of racial discrimination
in jury selection, Justice Scalia pointedly criticized Justice Marshall: “Justice Marshall’s
dissent rolls out the ultimate weapon, the accusation of insensitivity to racial
discrimination—which will lose its intimidating effect if it continues to be fired so
randomly.” Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 486 (1990). In one sarcastic sentence
written on behalf of himself and four colleagues, Scalia implied that claims of racial
discrimination are often illegitimate, used improperly in an attempt to intimidate other
justices, thereby providing proof that “the Supreme Court must, in fact, curtail its
attention and responsiveness to such issues.” Smith, supra note 108, at 839.
213
For example, when a five-member majority endorsed a lower court decision
requiring California to reduce its prison population because the system was unable to
provide adequate medical and mental health care to prisoners in overcrowded institutions,
thereby leading to needless deaths and physical suffering, Justice Alito issued a dire
warning about the results of the order: “The three-judge court ordered the premature
release of approximately 46,000 criminals—the equivalent of three Army divisions . . . . I
fear that today’s decision, like prior prisoner release orders, will lead to a grim roster of
victims.” Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1959, 1968 (2011). Despite Justice Alito’s
frightening claims about the impending release of a veritable “Army” of criminals to
inflict harm on the citizens of California, in fact, California developed a realignment plan
to reduce prison populations by having prisoners with shorter sentences serve their time
in county jails. In the aftermath of realign, the violent crime rate in California was at its
lowest level in nearly 50 years. MAGNUS LOFSTROM & BRANDON MARTIN, CALIFORNIA’S
FUTURE:
CORRECTIONS,
PUB.
POL’Y
INST.
OF
CAL.
(Feb.
2015),
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_215
MLR.pdf.
214
For example, Justice Thomas claimed that the fact that an officer sees and smells an
air freshener in a car can serve as a key element in forming reasonable suspicion that the
vehicle contains drugs. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1622 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
215
One commentator speculated that “[p]erhaps the savvy, media-aware [Chief Justice]
Roberts has finally learned the lessons of Ferguson” when he supported the individual’s
Fourth Amendment rights in Rodriguez, Stern, supra note 98. However, the same
commentator observed that “[w]hatever epiphany struck Roberts . . . seems to have
missed Justice Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Alito.” Id. Even if this
speculative comment about Roberts proves to be accurate, increased sensitivity by one
justice alone will have little impact on the direction of the Court’s decisions.
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to changes in the Court’s composition, and thereby positions thoughtful
new justices to employ their skepticism of police authority in rightsdeclaring decisions that strengthen constitutional protections. 216

216

As demonstrated by the protracted process for confirming President Obama’s
nominee Loretta Lynch as U.S. Attorney General in 2015, even the election of a liberal
Democrat as president in 2016 or subsequent elections may not lead to rights-defending
nominees to the Supreme Court if the Senate is controlled by Republicans who are
committed to resisting such appointments. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Senate Confirms
Loretta Lynch as Attorney General After Long Delay, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/us/politics/loretta-lynch-attorney-generalvote.html?_r=0.

